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Abstract 
The paper discusses some fundamental problems in monetary economics associated with the 
determination and role of the numéraire. The issues are introduced by formalising a proposal, 
attributed to Eisler, to remove the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates by unbundling the 
numéraire and medium of exchange/means of payment functions of money. The monetary authorities 
manage the exchange rate between the numéraire (‘sterling’) and the means of payment (‘drachma’). 
The short nominal interest rate on sterling bonds can then be used to target stability for the sterling 
price level. The paper puts question marks behind two key bits of conventional wisdom in 
contemporary monetary economics. The first is the assumption that the monetary authorities define 
and determine the numéraire used in private transactions. The second is the proposition that price 
stability in terms of that numéraire is the appropriate objective of monetary policy. The paper also 
discusses the merits of the next step following the decoupling of the numéraire from the currency: 
doing away with currency altogether - the cashless economy. 
Because the unit of account plays such a central role in New-Keynesian models with nominal 
rigidities, monetary economics needs to devote more attention to numérairology - the study of the 
individual and collective choice processes that govern the adoption of a unit of account and its role in 
economic behaviour. 
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1 Introduction
In his famous lectures on monetary theory "The Two Triads", Sir John Hicks tried to
establish a mapping between the three classical functions of money - means of payment
or medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account or numéraire, and the three
Keynesian motives for holding money: the transactions motive, the speculative motive
and the precautionary motive [32].1 The mapping was never completed: the role of money
as the numéraire or unit of account remained an orphan. This should not surprise us.
The role of the numéraire is one of the least researched and least well understood topics in
economics. Consider the following key questions: why and when does it matter what real,
nancial or imaginary object provides the unit that serves as the numéraire? How is the
numéraire (or how are the numéraires) determined or chosen in both barter and monetary
economies? Is there a reason for the common but not universal empirical association,
in systems with central bank at money, of the numéraire and the currency issued by
the central bank? It is surprising that, historically, even in non-at money systems,
the unit of account has tended to be a commonly used medium of exchange? From
within the canon of conventional neoclassical economics, including New Classical and
New Keynesian macroeconomics, these questions have not been answered satisfactorily,
if at all. Yet in both New Classical and New Keynesian macroeconomics the numéraire
plays a crucial role. In both approaches, the maintained assumption that at money
issued by the central bank (currency) is the numéraire, combined with the assumption
that the nominal interest rate on currency is constrained to equal zero, sets a zero oor
under the nominal interest rate, that is, the interest rate on instruments denominated in
terms of the numéraire. The further assumption that there is a non-zero real demand
for currency (sometimes derived from quasi-primitive restrictions on the ability to trade
real goods for real goods), means that the nominal interest rate on money (the interest
1Hicks did not consider a fourth function of money found in part of the literature, that of being the
standard of deferred payment. As I have never been able to determine what this expression means,
the standard of deferred paymentwill be ignored in what follows.
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rate in terms of the numéraire) will, in general, be welfare-relevant. All this applies even
when there are no nominal price or wage rigidities.
Even with exible prices it matters what the numéraire is. If the numéraire were
bread, for instance, it would be the bakers rather than the central bank that would deter-
mine the rate of ination, assuming they good bake with su¢ cient speed and exibility
to set the own rate of interest on bread. If in addition money wages or prices were
sticky in terms of the bread numéraire, the bakersguild would have a non-trivial mone-
tary stabilisation policy role. The welfare signicance of the numéraire when there are
nominal wage or price rigidities survives even in a cashless economy, interpreted here as
in Woodford (2003) as the limit of an economy in which central bank currency serves
as both means of payment and numéraire, as the demand for currency as a means of
payment goes to zero.
The fact that the choice of numéraire has implications for the existence of a liquidity
trap would not be of practical interest if the liquidity trap were a theoretical curiosum.
There can be little doubt that the liquidity trap was perceived in this way for much if
not most of the second half of the 20th century. But no longer. Means and methods for
removing the zero oor under the nominal interest rate became more than intellectual
curiosa when the Bank of Japans Discount rate fell to e¤ectively zero in September
2001, a level at which it stood until July 2006..2 When the Federal Funds rate target
of the Federal Reserve fell to 1.00 percent in July 2003 there was a non-negligible risk
that the zero lower bound could become a binding constraint on the ability to conduct
conventional expansionary monetary policy in the US. Similar concerns were expressed
when the ECBs policy rate was cut to 2.00 percent in June 2003. Clearly, the urgency to
nd a way to remove or bypass the zero lower bound has diminished since then, although
even at the time of writing (January 2007), the Bank of Japans policy rate stands only
at 0.25 percent.
The potential problem of the zero lower bound becoming a binding constraint on the
2October 2004.
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conduct of expansionary monetary policy has not disappeared, however. Central Banks
throughout the world are committed to the pursuit of price stability, often (though not
always, as the case of the US demonstrates) through the adoption and pursuit of a low
and stable target for the rate of ination.3 With the world-wide decline in long-run
risk-free real interest rates, the pursuit of a low rate of ination is likely to imply a
pattern of, on average, low nominal interest rates. This creates a non-negligible risk that
the economy could be impacted by a contractionary shock so severe, that even cutting
short nominal interest rates to zero would not represent an adequate monetary policy
response. This motivates continued study of alternative mechanisms for setting negative
nominal interest rates. The modalities for setting negative nominal interest rates in turn
highlight the importance of the extent to which the numéraire function can be unbundled
from the means of payment/medium of exchange function. It goes without saying that
for something to serve as a medium of exchange and means of payment, it will have to
willingly held between transactions and therefore will have to be a store of value. The
key (un)bundling therefore is between on the one hand the numéraire and on the other
hand the store of value that serves as means of payment and medium of exchange.4
In a comment on Buiter and Panigirtzoglous [11] paper on implementing negative
nominal interest rates by imposing a carry tax on currency, Professor Davies [20] points
to an interesting alternative mechanism for removing the zero lower bound on nominal
interests rates. This mechanism, which Davies attributes to Eisler [24], does not require
the administratively costly, cumbersome and intrusive payment of negative interest rates
on currency. Instead it involves the unbundling of the medium of exchange/means of
payment function of currency, sterling, say, from its numéraire/unit of account role.5
The zero lower bound is associated with the means of payment/medium of exchange
3The ECB does not admit to an ination target, but deems a rate of ination for the HICP index of
less than but close to 2 percent per annum consistent with the pursuit of price stability in the medium
term - an ination target that dare not speak its name.
4For the purposes of this paper, the distinction between the means of payment function (where
payment is dened as nal settlement of a claim) and the medium of exchange function does not matter.
5Unit of account, numeraire or standard of value includes what is sometimes called the standard of
deferred value, which means unit of account for contracts involving intertemporal trade.
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role of cash: the bearer bond property of currency makes it di¢ cult to pay interest (pos-
itive or negative) on currency.6 Instead, in the Eisler economy envisaged by Davies, the
authorities abolish sterling as a medium of exchange/means of payment by retiring all
sterling currency. Sterling continues to be the numéraire in key private transactions (es-
pecially wage settlements and domestic price contracts for goods and services) and the
authorities use the short sterling nominal interest rate, without a zero lower bound, to
pursue a sterling ination or sterling price level target. A new currency, the drachma, say,
is introduced to serve as the medium of exchange/means of payment in lieu of sterling.
Drachma currency, like sterling currency before it was abolished, has a zero nominal in-
terest rate. Both drachma-denominated and sterling-denominated interest-bearing bonds
are issued freely by the authorities. The authorities control and set the nominal interest
rate on sterling bonds and the exchange rates (spot and forward, current and future)
between drachma and sterling. Even with the interest rate on drachma bonds subject to
a zero oor set by the zero interest rate on drachma currency, the interest rate on sterling
bonds can be negative if the authorities make a credible commitment to appreciate the
sterling-drachma exchange rate.
This paper argues that Daviess proposal contains two potential weaknesses. The
rst is his assumption that the monetary authorities determine the unit of account, or,
more precisely, choose the object(s), real or nancial, some quantity of which serve as the
unit of account.7. The second is his assumption that it is the behaviour of the price level
in terms of that unit of account that matters for economic welfare, or more specically,
6In modern developed economies, the medium of exchange/means of payment role of currency applies
only to a small subset of all transactions - legitimate small scale retail payments and transactions in
the grey, black and underground economies. The vast majority of transactions in nancial claims, real
assets and in currently produced goods and services are not e¤ected through the exchange of curency or
settled in currency.
7Careful scholars in the eld of monetary economics have long made the point that it makes no sense
to say that money serves as a (or the) unit of account, "...since money is a tangible material not a unit
of measurement."(McCallum [36], p. 17, fn. 1). Correct usage would be to say "...that the medium of
account is the good some quantity of which serves as the unit of account (i.e. is used as the base for
quoted prices)" (McCallum [36], p. 17, fn. 1). Niehans [38], p. 118, fn 1. makes the same point: "Money
is here called a medium and not, as customary, a unit of account because, clearly, money itself is not a
unit, but the good whose unit is used as the unit of account."
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that the authorities should pursue price stability (in principle a zero rate of ination
going forward, in practice a low rate of ination for some real world price index) in terms
of that numéraire. The plausibility of both assumptions is questionable. This matters
not just in the Eisler universe, which does have a means of payment/medium of exchange
(currency, for short), although it does not assign the unit of account/numéraire role to the
currency, but also in a world without currency, in a cashless economy. One approach to
the numéraire in a cashless economy is to view it as disembodied, abstract numéraire or
virtual currency, phlogiston, say.8 In that case the authorities cannot set the interest rate
in terms of the numéraire. The alternative approach, adopted in this paper, following
Woodford [45], is to dene a unit of the numéraire as a unit of some at interest-bearing
nancial instrument issued by the government. In the Eisler economy and in its cashless
special case, a unit of the sterling numéraire would be a unit of the short sterling bond
- or a nancial instrument that is a perfect substitute for the short sterling bond, e.g.
commercial bank reserves with the central bank.
The determination of the numéraire and its signicance is a much-neglected issue
in monetary economics. The great monetary economists of previous generations dis-
tinguished carefully between what one of them, Patinkin, called "the abstract unit of
account" and the actual, physical (and today also digital), medium of exchange.9 The
abstract unit of account "...serves only for purposes of computation and record keeping.
This unit has no physical existence;"(Patinkin [40], p. 15). Patinkin refers to prices in
terms of the abstract unit of account as accounting prices and prices in terms of the
medium of exchange, as money prices. In what follows, accounting prices will also be
identied with contracting prices and invoicing prices.
8To emphasize the disassociation between the pure, disembodied numéraire or virtual money and
the embodied physical currency of old, I chose, in a di¤erent context, phlogiston to be the unit of
account or numéraire (Buiter [4]). According to a theory, advanced by J. J. Becher late in the 17th cent.
and extended and popularized by G. E. Stahl, in all ammable materials there is present phlogiston, a
substance without color, odor, taste, or weight that is given o¤ in burning.The phlogiston theory received
strong and wide support throughout a large part of the 18th century until it was refuted by the work of
A. L. Lavoisier (see The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia [16])
9For an object to serve as medium of exchange/means of payment it must of course also be a store of
value.
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Theoretical studies of cashlesseconomies have become something of a growth indus-
try (see e.g. Woodford [45] and the literature cited there). Nominal rigidities (that is,
price and/or wage rigidities in terms of the numéraire - rigid accounting and contract-
ing prices) play a central role in the New Keynesian literature (see e.g. Clarida, Galli
and Gertler [18], Woodford [45], Golosov and Lucas [29]). It is therefore appropriate to
issue a reminder about the complete absence of deep structural microfoundations of the
determination of the numéraire, how it emerges (or is selected) and how it matters for
economic behaviour.
In this paper I formalise Daviesproposal and discuss some of the wider implications of
the emergence of numérairology - the microfoundations of monetary economics without
money. Among the central questions the new cashless monetary economics, like the
old monetary economics with money, must address are the following. (1) How is the
numéraire determined? Who or what chooses the numéraire or how does it emerge
spontaneously from the trading and exchange interactions of purposefully acting but
not necessarily unboundedly rational private agents? (2) What determines whether the
numéraire be a pure abstract unit of account (like phlogiston), a nancial instrument with
a means of payment/medium of exchange function, a nancial instrument without any
special means of payment/medium of exchange function, or a real good or service valued
intrinsically as a consumer good or as a productive input? (3) What determines whether
there is just one numéraire or more than one? (4) Even if there is only one numéraire,
can the government set a short nominal interest rate in terms of that numéraire, that
is, can there be monetary policy(dened as nominal interest rate policy) in a cashless
economy? (5) Under what conditions is the general price level determinate in a cashless
economy? This paper argues that the answer to questions (4) and (5) are simple, but
that the questions to answers (1), (2) and (3) are di¢ cult. Existing answers to question
(1) are found to be wanting.
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2 Implementing negative nominal interest rates à la
Gesell or à la Eisler
2.1 The benchmark sterling economy
The benchmark is the sterling economy. Sterling is the only currency (means of pay-
ment/medium of exchange, cash) and the only numéraire. Currency is a liability of the
central bank with a risk-free nominal rate of interest iMt+1;t. There also are risk-free
sterling-denominated non-monetary nancial instruments (sterling bonds) with a risk-
free nominal sterling interest rate it+1;t. The consumers stochastic real interest factor
between periods t0 and t1 is
t1Q
k=t0+1
(1+ rk;k 1); t1 > t0; where rk;k 1 is the one-period real
consumption interest rate between periods k   1 and k: I use the discrete time version
of the simple model in Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [10], [11](a closed endowment economy
with a representative innite lived private household with rational expectations and a
New Keynesian price Phillips curve), to illustrate a much more general point.10 The
expectation operator conditional on information available in period t is Et and Covt is
the conditional covariance: Real household consumption in period t is Ct; the constant
level of real period-t government consumption is G; actual period-t output is Yt; the
(constant) natural output level or level of capacity output (the level of output that would
prevail with perfect price exibility) is Y ; the risk-free real consumption interest rate (at
market prices) between periods t0 and t1 is ~rt1;t0 ; and the sterling ination rate for con-
sumer prices is ~t1;t0 

~Pt1= ~Pt0

  1; where ~Pt is the period t sterling general consumer
price level.11 The nominal stock of sterling currency at the end of period t is Mt and
mt  Mt= ~Pt is the real stock of sterling currency. The period-t sterling producer price
level is Pt and the ination rate of sterling producer prices is t1;t0 = (Pt1=Pt0)  1: The
10The household decision problem and the derivation of the price setting rule are a simple special case
of the New-Keynesian model analysed at length in such standard works as [45]. For simplicity I assume
that the period utility function is additively separable in the logarithms of consumption, leisure and real
money balances. A detailed derivation is available from the author on request. A fully worked-out
model with all the properties assigned to the simple model of the present paper can be found in [6].
11Note that (1 + ~rt;t 1)
 1
= Et 1(1+ rt;t 1) 1 where the expectation is taken over all possible states.
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core ination rate between periods t0 and t1 is !t1;t0 : It is the component of ination that
is subject to behavioural nominal rigidities. I also dene y  lnY and y  ln Y : The
period t indirect tax rate is  t so ~Pt  (1 +  t)Pt: For t  0; the sterling economy is
described by equations (1) to (10):
C 1t =
1
1 + 
(1 + it+1;t)Et
 
(1 + ~t;t+1)C
 1
t+1

=
1
1 + 
(1 + ~rt+1;t)EtC
 1
t+1; (1)
 > 0; C  0
yt = ln(Ct +G) (2)
Either
yt = y (3)
or
t;t 1   !t;t 1   (yt   y) + Et (t+1;t   !t+1;t) : (4)
0  G < ey; 1    0;   0
~t;t 1  t;t 1 +  t    t 1 (5)
it+1;t = + Et~t+1;t + (Et~t+1;t   b~); if + Et~t+1;t + (Et~t+1;t   b~)  iMt+1;t (6a)
= iMt+1;t if + Et~t+1;t + (Et~t+1;t   b~) < iMt+1;t (6b)
 > 0
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1 + ~rt+1;t = (1 + it+1;t)

1 + Et~t;t+1 +
Covt(~t;t+1; C
 1
t+1)
EtC
 1
t+1

(7)
mt  Mt~Pt
= 

1 + it+1;t
it+1;t   iMt+1;t

Ct (8)
  0; i  iM ; M  0; ~P  0
E0 lim
t!1
tY
j=0

1
1 + rj+1;j

(1 + iMt+1;t)
Mt
~Pt+1
= 0 (9)
M 1 = M 1 (10)
~P 1 = ~P 1
Equation (1) contains two key consumption Euler equations.12 Equation (2) states
that actual output equals the sum of private and public consumption. Equation (3),
output equals capacity output, represents the output market clearing condition when
prices are fully exible. Equation (4) is a log-linear approximation at the deterministic
steady state of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, based on Calvos [13] model of staggered
overlapping nominal price contracts (see also Taylor [41], Buiter and Jewitt [8] and Buiter
and Miller [9] for similar models). Qualitatively it captures all key aggregate features of
the version of Calvos pricing model expounded in Woodford [45], although it cannot
capture the relative price variability of that disaggregated model. The variable !t;t 1
represents the behaviour of the constrained price setters of the Calvo model in period
t; that is, the behaviour of those agents j which cannot freely set their price in period
t and instead update the logarithm of their price of the previous period, pt 1(j); say,
12The period utility function is assumed to be logarithmic in consumption. The pure rate of time
preference is :
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using the indexation rule pt(j) = !t;t 1+ pt 1(j): Core ination is the name given to the
ad-hoc, behavioural indexation factor !t;t 1: An example would be the one-period lagged
indexation rule proposed by Woodford [45], which can be written as
!t;t 1 = t 1;t 2 (11)
This indexation rule is partial when 0 <  < 1: Calvos original model can be in-
terpreted as the special case of (11) when  = 0: In this version of the model, the rate
of ination is non-predetermined (exible) even though the price level is predetermined
(sticky). Full one-period-lagged indexation is the special case of (11) when  = 1; that
is,
!t;t 1 = t 1;t 2: (12)
With this indexation rule, the actual and natural levels of output will be the same for
any constant rate of ination.
Full current indexation with complete contemporaneous information would produce
the following indexation function:
!t;t 1 = t;t 1: (13)
With this indexation function, all ination inertia vanishes and actual output always
equals its natural level.
An example of full current indexation with partial contemporaneous information
would be:
!t;t 1 = Et 1t;t 1: (14)
With (14), actual output equals its natural level whenever the rate of ination is fully
anticipated.
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Equation (5) denes the relationship between consumer prices and producer prices.
Equation (6a) is a simplied Taylor rule for the short nominal interest rate on sterling
bonds; b~ can be interpreted as the target rate of ination of consumer prices.13 The
Taylor rule only determines the short nominal interest rate if this is greater than or
equal to the nominal interest rate on sterling currency. If application of the Taylor rule
would put the nominal interest rate on sterling bonds below the nominal interest rate
on sterling currency, the actual nominal interest rate on sterling bonds equals that on
sterling currency. When in the discussion that follows, optimal policy is considered, the
Taylor rule (6a) is overridden when its application cannot support the social optimum.
Equation (7) links the risk-free nominal and risk-free real sterling interest rates through
the expected ination rate of the sterling general price level and an ination risk pre-
mium. The demand for real sterling currency is proportional to real private consumption
and inversely proportional to the pecuniary opportunity cost of holding sterling cur-
rency.14 The cashless economy is the special case where  = 0: The boundary condition
(9) is obtained from the Standard Transversality Condition of the household optimisa-
tion problem, which implies that the present value of terminal household nancial wealth
(monetary and non-monetary) is zero, and from the governments intertemporal budget
constraint, that the present discounted value of the governments terminal stock of non-
monetary debt is non-positive. When the government follows a scal-nancial-monetary
programme for which its intertemporal budget constraint holds with equality, the bound-
ary condition (9) follows. The asymmetry between the private and government solvency
constraints is due to the assumption that government-issued at base money is viewed
as an asset by the holder (the households) but not, in the long run, as a liability by
the issuer (the government). This irredeemability or inconvertibility of base money is a
13It makes no substantive di¤erence to any of the issues discussed in the paper whether the Taylor
rule targets the rate of ination of the consumer price level or of the producer price level.
14This follows from a money-in-the-utility-function model of money demand when the period util-
ity function of the representative household is assumed to be additively separable in the logarithm of
consumption and the logarithm of real money balances.
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primitive assumption (see Buiter [5], [7] and Buiter and Sibert [12]).
Treating the own rate of interest on currency as exogenous, the instrument of the
monetary authorities is either the nominal quantity of sterling currency or the nominal
interest rate on short sterling bonds.15 Descriptive realism makes it+1;t the monetary
instrument in the sterling economy. The simplied Taylor rule in (6a) is a reasonably
descriptively realistic example of a nominal interest rate rule, but plays no essential role
in the argument.
In Buiter [6] I show that, in an upmarketversion of the simple model used here,16 for
both the exible price version and for a version with Calvos staggered overlapping price
setting mechanism, the social optimum is achieved when two conditions are satised.
First, the pecuniary opportunity cost of holding cash is zero - the optimal quantity of
money (OQM) rule of Bailey [1] and Friedman [26] given in (15) applies and there are no
shoe-leather costs. Second, and actual output equals its natural level (equation (16)).17
The latter condition is, of course, automatically satised in the exible price model.
it+1;t = i
M
t+1;t (15)
15Base money includes commercial bank sterling balances held with the central bank as well as sterling
currency (and coint). Such balances held in electronic ledgers are not bearer bonds. The Central bank
knows the identity of each account holder and the balance outstanding. Paying interest on commercial
bank balances held with the central bank is easy and e¤ectively costless. Formally, such balances are
either ignored in what follows, or they are perfect substitutes for sterling bonds but not for currency (in
retail transactions etc.).
16Households have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over a bundle of di¤erentiated consumption goods. Each
households labour endowment can either be consumed as leisure, used to produce a unique single variety
of the consumption good or used to manage cash-balances. Consumer goods are subject to a exible
cash-in-advance constraint. Consumer goods prices are determined by monopolistically competitive
price setters constrained by Calvo-style staggered, overlapping nominal price contracts and simple price
indexation rules for the constrained price setters. Fully exible prices are a limiting case of the Calvo-style
contract. The scal authorities can use production subsidies to address ine¢ ciencies due to monopoly
power, and an indirect tax (VAT or sales tax) to drive a wedge between the consumer price level and
the producer price level. The simpler model used here permits me to reproduce all the key insights of
this richer, more detailed and more complex model, provided the New Keynesian Phillips curves ( (4)
for the Sterling economy and (33) for the Eisler economy) are taken on faith as acceptable log-linear
approximations to the true underlying non-linear relationships.
17I assume for simplicity that the natural rate level of output is e¢ cient. The Calvo model has
monopolistic competition in the output market, so the natural level of output is too low. I assume
that such steady-state real distortionshave been corrected through non-lump sum taxes or subsidies or
through regulation. None of the key results of the paper depend on the e¢ ciency of the natural rate.
12
yt = y: (16)
With Calvo price contracts, the second optimality condition, (16), is satised (for any
indexation function) if and only if actual producer price ination equals core producer
price ination:
t;t 1 = !t;t 1: (17)
Equality of actual and core producer price ination is automatically satised if the
constrained price setters use full current indexation with complete contemporaneous in-
formation (equation 13). For any other core ination process, it requires that the actual
producer price ination rate validate the core ination rate. If the nominal interest rate
on money, iMt+1;t; can be set freely, then this validation can be achieved even if the nominal
interest rate on bonds it+1;t is governed by the Taylor rule (6a) and (6b). Appropriate
manipulation of the indirect tax rate  t (see equation (5)) can translate the consumer
price ination rate ~t;t 1 determined from the consumer Euler equation (1) into a pro-
ducer price ination rate t;t 1 that validates the core ination rate !t;t 1. Alternatively,
the actual producer price ination rate can be made to validate the core ination rate
even with a constant indirect tax rate, if the Taylor rule (6a) and (6b) is dropped and the
nominal interest rate on bonds is dedicated to equating actual (consumer and producer
price) ination to core ination period-by-period. If the nominal interest rate on cash is
constrained to equal zero, the OQM rule can only be implemented with a zero nominal
interest rate on bonds, and the Taylor rule would have to be jettisoned to support the so-
cial optimum. The indirect tax rate then would have to be managed to equate the actual
and the core ination rates of producer prices. When prices are fully exible, nominal
equilibrium values, P; ~P and M are indeterminate for any interest rate rule that makes i
and iM a function of real variables only.18 With the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, the
price level is always determinate, through history, that is, through the initial condition
18This includes exogenous or open-loopsequences for the two nominal interest rates.
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for the general price level, except in the case of full contemporaneous indexation (given
by 13), which eliminates all traces of nominal rigidity.
2.2 Gesells carry tax on currency
If, as is the case in practice, the own rate of interest on sterling currency is zero, the
risk-free nominal interest rate on sterling bonds, it+1;t, cannot be lower than zero:19
it+1;t  0: (18)
If the e¤ective pursuit of the policy objectives of the monetary authorities (assumed to
be a stable sterling price level or a low sterling rate of ination) were to call for negative
nominal interest rates on sterling bonds, policy would be impeded by the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate. Paying interest on currency is di¢ cult because
currency is a negotiable bearer bond. The identity of the bearer (the owner) is not
known to the issuer. Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [10, 11]revived a proposal going back at
least to Gesell [28] for paying negative interest on currency by requiring that currency
be stamped periodically in order to remain a legal nancial instrument (see also Fisher
[25] and Goodfriend [30]). The bearer of the currency could be taxed (thus receiving a
negative interest rate on currency) at the time the currency was stamped. Suitable nes
or other penalties would be required to induce the bearer of the currency to come forward
to pay this carry tax on currency. The non-negativity constraint on the risk-free nominal
interest rate on sterling bonds would be replaced by the constraint that the risk-free
nominal interest rate on sterling bonds cannot be lower than the interest rate on sterling
currency, iMt+1;t:
it+1;t  iMt+1;t: (19)
With this carry tax, the interest rate on currency can be set at any negative (or
19For simplicity we ignore di¤erential carry costs for currency and bonds.
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positive) level. Collecting it would, however, be cumbersome, costly and intrusive. A
lower cost implementation of negative interest rates on currency than those associated
with Gesells proposal for stamped currency would be welcome.
2.3 Eislers unbundling of numéraire and currency
Daviess proposal, which he attributes to Eisler [24], is simple.20 The authorities un-
bundle the means of payment/medium of exchange role of money from its numéraire or
unit of account function. All sterling notes and coins are retired, so sterling currency no
longer exists in physical form (or even in disembodied, virtual form as balances held in
an electronic ledger). The sterling money demand function (8) is no longer part of the
household decision rules. The constraint that the nominal interest rate on sterling bonds
cannot be below the interest rate on sterling currency has become moot.
The authorities introduce a new currency, drachma say, which takes on the means
of payment and medium of exchange role formerly performed by sterling currency. The
interest rate on the new drachma currency is zero, for the same reason the interest rate
on the old sterling currency was zero. Davies assumes that sterling remains the unit of
account for the wage and price contracts that matter, and that it is the sterling price
level whose behaviour (stability, low ination) the authorities continue to target. For
that reason, the fact the nominal interest rate on sterling bonds is no longer subject to
the zero lower bound is what matters, rather than the fact that the nominal interest rate
on drachma bonds is now subject to the zero lower bound.
The assumption that sterling remains the unit of account is reected in the retention
of the sterling Phillips curve in equation (4) as the relevant pricing equation in the Eisler
economy, following the disappearance of sterling currency. There continue to be nominal
rigidities in the sterling price level and, if core ination depends on lagged actual ination,
also in the sterling rate of ination. The sterling price level remains a predetermined state
variable. The assumption that the authorities continue to target the sterling price level
20Further information on Eisler and virtual currenciescan be found in [22], [27] and [2].
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or sterling rate of ination is reected in the retention of the Taylor rule (6a) for the short
sterling interest rate. This is a feedback rule from the sterling rate of ination, which
includes a sterling ination target b~:
The nominal stock of drachma currency is M; the drachma general consumer price
level is ~P ; the risk-free nominal interest rate on drachma bonds is i and the nominal
interest rate on drachma currency is i
M
: The consumers real rate of return on nominal
drachma bonds is r: There is a demand for real drachma currency from the private
sector, m, given in (20) which has the same functional form as the demand for real
sterling balances in (8):
mt 
Mt
~P t
= 
 
1 + it+1;t
it+1;t   iMt+1;t
!
Ct: (20)
M  0; ~P   0; i  iM
The boundary condition for the household becomes:
E0 lim
t!1
tY
j=0

1
1 + rj+1;j

(1 + i
M
t+1;t)M

t
~P t+1
= 0 (21)
and the initial conditions become:
M 1 = M

 1 (22)
~P  1 = ~P

 1
The risk-free one-period real consumption interest rate in the drachma economy, ~r
satises
1 + ~rt+1;t =
 
1 + it+1;t
 
1 + Et~

t;t+1 +
Covt(~

t;t+1; C
 1
t+1)
EtC
 1
t+1
!
where ~t1;t0 

~P t1=
~P t0

  1 is the drachma consumer price ination rate between
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periods t0 and t1:21 The drachma producer price ination rate is t1;t0 
 
P t1=P

t0
   1
and ~P t = (1 +  t)P

t :
Since, by assumption, the nominal interest rate on drachma currency in the Eisler
economy, is zero, i
M
t+1;t = 0; the risk-free nominal interest rate on drachma bonds is
subject to the zero lower bound:
it+1;t  0: (23)
However, equation (6b), the lower bound on the sterling nominal interest rate, no
longer applies in the Eisler economy, since there no longer is any sterling currency earning
the rate iM : The government issues both sterling-denominated and drachma-denominated
bonds. If drachma bonds and sterling bonds can both be issued and held by the private
sector, their risk-adjusted returns should be equalised. Since both i and i are risk-free
interest rates, they are linked by covered interest parity (CIP). Let St be the period-t
spot exchange rate between sterling and drachma (dened as the number of drachma per
unit of sterling) and Ft+1;t the period t one-period forward exchange rate. Then
1 + it+1;t =
St
Ft+1;t
(1 + it+1;t) (24)
The authorities have three instruments: the nominal interest rate on sterling bonds
and the spot and forward exchange rates between sterling and drachma. Given these
three, the risk-free nominal interest rate on drachma bonds is determined as
1 + it+1;t =
Ft+1
St
(1 + it+1;t) if
Ft+1;t
St
(1 + it+1;t)  1 (25a)
= 1 if
Ft+1
St
(1 + it+1;t) < 1 (25b)
Let 't1;t0 
Ft1;t0
St0
be the one plus the proportional forward premium on sterling vis-à-
21Et(1 + r

t+1;t)
 1 = (1 + ~rt+1;t)
 1
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vis drachma (the sterling forward premium factor). A negative nominal interest rate on
sterling bonds can be implemented even if the nominal interest rate on drachma bonds is
constrained by the zero lower bound on drachma nominal interest rates. If, for instance,
it+1;t = 0; then it+1;t =
1 't+1;t
't+1;t
: By setting the forward price of sterling above its spot
price (by appreciatingsterling relative to the drachma), that is, by setting 't+1;t > 1;
the nominal interest rate on sterling bonds can always be set by the authorities at any
desired negative level, even when the nominal interest rate on drachma bonds is bounded
from below by zero.
The forward rate cannot, of course, be set independently of the (expected) path of
future spot rates. Let t1;t0  St1=St0 be one plus the proportional rate of appreciation
of sterling in terms of drachma (the sterling appreciation factor). In e¢ cient nancial
markets, the following relationship holds between the sterling interest rate, the drachma
interest rate and current and future spot exchange rates when the period utility function
is logarithmic in consumption:
1 + it+1;t
1 + it+1;t
= Ett;t+1 +
Covt
 
C 1t+1~t;t+1; t;t+1

Et
 
C 1t+1~t;t+1
 : (26)
If the conditional covariance in (26) is zero, say because there is no subjective uncer-
tainty about the future nominal spot exchange rate, the expected future spot exchange
rate equals the current forward rate, as in (27), that is, uncovered interest parity (UIP)
prevails, as in (28).22
Ft+1;t = EtSt+1 (27)
1 + it+1;t
1 + it+1;t
= Ett;t+1: (28)
Commodity arbitrage ensures that the sterling price of each good or service equals
the drachma price of that good or service, multiplied by the price of drachma in terms of
22The same applies if investors are risk-neutral and currency appreciation and sterling ination rates
are uncorreclated.
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sterling. Since this law of one price(LOP) holds for each good and service produced and
consumed in the domestic economy, it also holds for the aggregate sterling and drachma
price levels:23
PtSt = P

t (29a)
~PtSt = ~P

t (29b)
or
t+1;tt+1;t = 

t+1;t (30a)
~t+1;tt+1;t = ~

t+1;t (30b)
If follows that in the Eisler economy, the real return on nominal sterling bonds is
equal to the real return on nominal drachma bonds if UIP prevails, which will be the case
if the behaviour of the nominal exchange rate is certain, in which case 31 holds:
1 + rt+1;t  (1 + it+1;t) ~t;t+1 = St+1
Ft+1;t
 
1 + it+1;t

~t;t+1 
St+1
Ft+1;t
 
1 + rt+1;t

: (31)
Note that equation (1) is still an appropriate characterisation of optimal consumption
behaviour although the following Euler equation also holds:
C 1t = 
 
1 + it+1;t

Et
 
(1 + ~t;t+1)C
 1
t+1

= (1 + ~rt+1;t)EtC
 1
t+1: (32)
Not surprisingly, the capacity to achieve, through a fully credible appreciation of
sterling in terms of drachma, lower sterling nominal interest rates than drachma nominal
interest rates does not translate, because of the Law of one Price, into a capacity to
23We are pricing, in a given country, a given bundle of goods and services in two currencies. Familiar
trade theory reasons for departures from the law of one price (transportation costs, taxes, market segmen-
tation, price discrimination) and from purchasing power parity (non-traded goods, di¤erent commodity
baskets) therefore dont apply here.
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achieve lower real rates of return on nominal sterling bonds than on nominal drachma
bonds. Sterling appreciation lowers both the sterling nominal interest rate relative to the
drachma nominal interest rates and the sterling rate of ination relative to the drachma
rate of ination. When the sterling appreciation rate is certain, the two e¤ects cancel
each other out exactly.
However, the fact that in the Eisler economy, if the nominal exchange rate is certain,
the real rate of return on nominal sterling bonds is the same as the real rate of return on
nominal drachma bonds; does not mean that real interest rates, including the risk-free
real rate of interest in the Eisler economy, ~r; is the same as it would have been had the
lower bound on the sterling nominal interest rate not been removed. Equations (1), (4)
(6a) and (7) apply unchanged in the Eisler economy, but the lower bound on the nominal
interest rate on sterling bonds, (6b) has been eliminated and the range of i now is the
entire real line. The behaviour of the risk-free real interest rate ~r is also a¤ected and
altered by the removal of the lower bound on the nominal interest rate on sterling bonds.
This is immediately obvious if we assume that  = 0; but it is also true for positive values
of :
3 The three key building blocks of the Eisler econ-
omy
Whether or not Daviess proposal is of practical interest rests on one technical assumption,
which turns out not to be problematic, and on two key behavioural assumptions, both
of which are by no means self-evident. The technical assumption is that the monetary
authorities can x the relative spot and forward prices of sterling and the drachma even
though sterling currency no longer exists. The rst key behavioural assumption is that
the monetary authorities determine what the (unique) unit of account in the economy
is. Sterling remains the (unique) unit of account even though the drachma is now the
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medium of exchange and means of payment. The second key behavioural assumption is
that it is the behaviour of the price level in terms of this unit of account (sterling) or the
rate of ination of this price level that matters for economic welfare and that it therefore
is the sterling price level/rate of ination that is or should be targeted by the monetary
authorities.
3.1 How do the authorities set the sterling-drachma exchange
rate in the Eisler economy?
In the Eisler economy, sterling appears to be an abstract (disembodied) numéraire - a
virtual currency. As there is no sterling currency, earning a sterling rate of interest of
it+1;t can therefore not mean that for every unit of sterling currency given up in period t
one gets back 1+ it+1;t units of currency in period t+1: In normal parlance, the sterling-
drachma spot exchange rate refers to the spot exchange rate of a unit of sterling currency
for a unit of drachma currency. This denition cannot apply in the Eisler economy, since
sterling currency no longer exists. To peg the relative price of two currencies (as for
any two commodities) the price xing agent has to be willing and able to supply or
absorb any amount demanded or supplied by the other market participants at that price.
Since sterling currency no longer exists, xing the relative price of sterling currency and
drachma currency is not possible in the Eisler economy: one cannot price phlogiston.
This turns out not to be a substantive objection, however. The solution can be found
in Woodfords ([45]) characterisation of a cashless economy. In such an economy, currency
(of any kind) no longer exists but the government still issues a nancial instrument
that can be interpreted as the other (non-currency) component of the monetary base:
commercial bank balances held with the central bank or bank reserves for short. Unlike
currency, reserves are not negotiable bearer bonds: the identity of their owner is known
to the issuer (the central bank). It is therefore trivial to pay interest on reserves at a
positive or a negative rate. The unit of account in terms of which these reserves are
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denominated is the same as that of the defunct currency - sterling in the Eisler model.
The authorities issue or purchase this sterling-denominated nancial instrument - reserves
- on demand at the spot and forward prices of sterling in terms of drachma currency, St
and Ft+1;t; that they set. The sterling-drachma spot exchange rate is therefore the spot
exchange rate of a unit of sterling reserves for a unit of drachma currency. The further
assumption is then made that sterling bank reserves and sterling one-period bonds are
perfect substitutes in private portfolios (o¤er the same pay-o¤s in every state of nature)
and therefore that they both earn a period return of it+1;t. Thus, a unit of sterling also
means (is) a unit of the sterling bond. Since a unit of drachma currency buys one unit
of drachma bonds, the sterling-drachma spot exchange rate is also the exchange rate of
a unit of sterling reserves for a unit of drachma bonds.,
In the Eisler economy, as in the cashless economy (the special case of both the bench-
mark sterling economy and the Eisler economy where  = 0), it therefore cannot be true
to say that sterling is a pure abstract numéraire or virtual currency if the authorities are
able to set the sterling rate of interest. There has to be something, a nancial instrument
called sterling, whose rate of return can be xed by the government because the govern-
ment denes what sterling is and can issue or retire any amount of this instrument at
any time, o¤ering any rate of return in wishes in terms of sterling. In the Eisler economy
as in the cashless economy, sterling is the sterling bond, or a perfect substitute for it.
Woodfords interest-bearing commercial bank reserves with the central bank, the non-
currency component of the monetary base, which are perfect substitutes for one-period
sterling bonds, are the obvious candidate. You can therefore price phlogiston, and set
the phlogiston rate of interest, if you dene phlogiston to be the unit in terms of which
some nancial instrument of the authorities is denominated.
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3.2 Who or what determines the numéraire?
Davies assumes that the government (the monetary authorities) determines what the
unique unit of account in the economy is.  The monetary authorities could withdraw all
existing cash while maintaining the existing monetary unit of account;(emphasis added).
How would they do this? As pointed out by Davies [20], there is no doubt that the govern-
ment (including the monetary authority) can do much to encourage the use of a particular
numéraire for invoicing and recording transactions and for denominating contracts. The
government can choose units of account (or a single unit of account) in terms of which
one or more of its own nancial liabilities are dened. It can declare certain nancial in-
struments (including some of its own liabilities) to be legal tender, and it can decide what
should be the unit of account that denes the nancial instruments that have legal tender
status. The government can legislate that nancial contracts between private parties are
not enforceable in the courts unless they are denominated in terms of a particular unit
of account.24 It can choose the units of account used to dene tax liabilities. The gov-
ernment may even be able to determine the unit of account in a wide range of contracts
involving itself, other agents of the state and the private sector. It is certainly possible
that the governments use of a particular unit of account to dene its nancial liabilities
and its insistence on the use of that unit of account in (most of) its transactions with
other parties, make is likely that private parties would use that same unit of account in
exchanges and contracts among themselves.
Possible, but not necessary or inevitable. Davies points out, correctly and with his-
torical evidence to back it up, that the unit of account used (or used most widely) in a
society need not be the unit of denomination of whatever nancial instruments are used
as means of payment and medium of exchange. Everyone is familiar with the Guinea,
which was neither the o¢ cial unit of account used by the UK monetary authorities in
their transactions, nor a medium of exchange/means of payment after 1813, but continued
24This would, presumably, not apply to contracts between private domestic parties and foreign resi-
dents.
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to be used as the numéraire in auction houses and expensive and pretentious shops until
decimalisation in 1971.25 The Guinea example contradicts both the view that the private
unit of account (that is the unit of account used in transactions between private parties)
is the o¢ cial monetary unit of account, and the view that the numéraire is whatever
the medium of exchange/means of payment is. However, it is true that most histori-
cal examples from the at government money era bundle in a single object/instrument
the governments unit of account, the unit of account used in contracts between private
parties and the means of payment/medium of exchange for most retail transactions.
Unfortunately, the historical evidence on societies in which the numéraire and means
of payment/medium of exchange functions were unbundled, while rich and varied, is
anecdotal and patchy. I can only o¤er a partial sample here.
The historical record of primitive monies, described in Paul Einzigs fascinating book
[23] contains many examples of the uncoupling of the o¢ cial numéraire function both
from the private numéraire and from the medium of exchange/means of payment func-
tion. While the evidence is patchy, there are numerous examples cited by Einzig of
the numéraire used in private contracts followingthe o¢ cial numéraire rather than the
medium of exchange/means of payment. Medieval Iceland had a cattle, a cloth and a
sh-standard. The monetary unit known as the kugildi was dened precisely in terms
of a standardized cow.26 It is doubtful that the kugildi could ever have been extensively
used as a medium of exchange. Einzig reports that in documents it was often explicitly
stated that "...payment xed in kugildi was actually to be made in metallic money or
in other form" ([23], p. 260). Plain home-woven woollen cloth (wadmal) served as a
general standard of value (unit of account) throughout the Icelandic medieval period.
25The guinea came into existence in 1666 under King Charles II. The last guinea was issued in 1813,
but the guinea continued to be used as a monetary unit of account until decimalisation in 1971. When
they were rst issued, one Guinea exchanged for one Pound (or 20 shillings). The relative price of the
Pound Sterling and the Guinea uctuated widely, reecting changes in the relative price of silver and
gold, until the de-facto demonetisation of silver in the UK in 1817. At that time, the Pound Sterling,
the UKs monetary unit, was worth 20 shillings (or 100 new pence). The Guinea was worth 21 shillings
(or 105 new pence).
26"The standard of value was the cow of 3-10 winters. It had to be at least of medium size; it had to
have had less than 3 calves, and it had to be without blemish, horned, and milking" ( [23], p. 260).
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It was used to determine the amount of wergeld 27 to be paid and for the valuation of
damages. Taxes were xed in wadmal. Unlike kugildi, wadmal was widely used as a
medium of exchange. There was a xed legal exchange rate between kugildi and wadmal.
In the 15th century, dried stocksh appears to have been used widely in Iceland as a unit
of account. Einzig expresses doubt as to whether it was widely used as a medium of
exchange ([23], p. 262), and one can only hope he is right in this. In the case of the
wadmal, it is interesting that, while the authorities xed taxes in terms of wadmal, there
was no monetary authority with a monopoly of the supply of wadmal. Every home with
a spinning wheel and a hand-loom could become a private mint.
In more recent times, and even in the at money era, there are examples that support
the view that the unit of account used most widely in a society need not be the o¢ cial
monetary unit used to dene (some of) the liabilities of the central bank. In countries with
very high ination or hyperination, the unit of account has often been a more stable
foreign currency, although the means of payment/medium of exchange for small-scale
retail transactions remained the national currency. For instance, the US dollar played
that role in Israel during the ination surge that prompted the successful stabilisation plan
of July 1985 and in Peru during the hyperination that led to the successful stabilisation
package of August 1990. The US dollar was used as the numéraire for posting retail
prices, but after a hasty verication of the current exchange rate, retail transactions
tended to be settled in shekels, respectively intis or soles.
An interesting, albeit short-lived monetary experiment took place in the eleven coun-
tries that made up the Eurozone between the date of the o¢ cial designation of the euro as
the new numéraire on January 1, 1999 and the introduction of the physical euro currency
around January 1, 2002.28 During that three-year period, the national legacy currencies
continued to function as media of exchange and means of payment for cash transac-
27In Europe during the middle ages , wergeld was the compensation to be paid to the heirs of a slain
man by the slayer(s) or his (their) kin. In various forms and under di¤erent names, similar practices
existed wordwide and continue to exist in many countries.
28Greece joined the Eurozone as its twelfth member on 1-1-2001.
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tions. O¢ cially, however, the euro was the numéraire from January 1, 1999 on, and the
national currencies represented inconvenient non-integer denominations of the euro. In
reality, however, the national legacy currencies continued to be used overwhelmingly as
the unit of account not just in transactions involving payment with these national legacy
currencies, but also in contracts that might be settled using non-cash means of payment.
The numéraire in the bulk of private transactions (cash and non-cash) stayed with the
means of payment/medium of exchange despite the introduction of the new numéraire,
the euro. In practice, until euro currency was introduced and the national legacy cur-
rencies lost their legal tender status, the euro was treated as an inconvenient non-integer
denomination of the national legacy currencies.
A set of interesting social experiments that may shed some light on who or what
determines the numéraire and how this relates to the medium of exchange/means of pay-
ment function can be found in the proliferation of LETS money schemes29. These Local
Exchange Trading Systems, and similar schemes like ROCS (Robust Complementary
Community Currency System) and Time Dollars, build on a venerable tradition going
back at least 70 years.30 LETS is a closed mutual credit system. LETS moneyis issued
by participants as mutual credit - each transaction is recorded as a matching credit and
debit in the two participantsaccounts. Credit can be used to acquire in the future a
certain range of goods and services from the other participants (account holders) in the
system (a very simple example with just a single good is a baby-sitting pool). The interest
rate (in terms of the numéraire used to record the debits and credits) is typically zero.
The LETS system uses the national currency of the country where it is located as the
numéraire, but national currency is not used to settle transactions - there is no currency,
only the instantaneous and simultaneous recording of the debit and matching credit. The
ROCS system uses an hour of standardised labour time as the unit of account. This is
29I am indebted to Carol Burgoyne for drawing my attention this this phenomenon. See e.g.
http://www.transaction.net/money/lets/ .
30For instance, the WIR (Wirtschaftsring or Business Circle) founded in Zurich in 1934 built on the ex-
ample of an even earlier Scandinavian organisation (see http://www.ex.ac.uk/~RDavies/arian/wir.html).
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neither the numéraire of the monetary authorities nor a currency issued by the monetary
authorities or by the ROCS system. It is an example of a cashless (local) exchange and
credit system where the numéraire is not the unit of account of the monetary authorities.
Davies is not alone in asserting without any supporting argument that the monetary
authorities determine the private unit of account. Woodford [45] writes: . . . the unit of
account in a purely at system is dened in terms of the liabilities of the central bank.
(Woodford [45], p. 35, emphasis in the original); and The special feature of central banks,
then, is simply that hey are entities whose liabilities happen to be used to dene the unit
of account in a wide range of contracts that other people exchange with one another [45],
p. 37. This amounts to a legal restrictionstheory of the determination of the numéraire.
Even the casual empirical evidence referred to earlier su¢ ces to make the point that the
proposition that the monetary authorities determine, as if by at, the private unit of
account, does not stand up to scrutiny.
What serves as unit of account in private transactions and private contracts and in
the mental arithmetic involved in economic calculation and computation is determined
by individual choice conditioned by social convention, rooted in culture and history, not
by government decree. The unit of account that matters for private decision makers and
is used to record transactions among private parties, is decided by them alone. Nothing
in the primitive assumptions of conventional (unboundedly rational) optimising economic
theory (preferences, information, technology, endowments) implies that the private unit
of account - the unit of account used for private calculation and computation and for
recording contracts between private parties - be dened in terms of the liabilities of the
central bank or in terms of the media of exchange or means of payment widely used
in the economy. There is no requirement that it be something that exists either in the
physical world or in the world of cyberspace it could be something purely imaginary like
the aforementioned phlogiston. Di¤erent private agents within the same polity may use
di¤erent units of account for invoicing, contracting and mental calculus. This would seem
to be an area of research where controlled experiments may o¤er more hope of insight
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than reasoning from rst principles or studying the uncontrolled one-time experiment
called history.
Conventional (unbounded rationality) economics has no theory of the numéraire. To
explain at a deep level why the numéraire is one thing rather than another, why the
numéraire is so often (although not universally) the means of payment/medium of ex-
change in everyday retail transactions, why it so often (but again not universally) is
the unit of denomination of the central banks liabilities, and why it matters what the
numéraire is, requires the abandonment of unbounded rationality. The fact that sterling
is used in the Eisler economy as the unit of account by the monetary authorities may well
make it a likely focal point as the numéraire used in private invoices and contracts and
for private measurement and calculations. By the same token, the fact that drachma are
used as the means of payment/medium of exchange also makes the drachma a natural
focal point as the (or a) private numéraire.
The choice of the private unit of account may also be inuenced by the way private
agents perceive and frame the reality they try to measure and capture with numbers.
That the ROCS schemes use standardised units of labour time (SULT) as the unit of
account is no doubt inuenced by the labour theory of value that appears to be part of
the mindset of many of the proponents of and participants in this scheme.31 It matters
because, were wages or prices to be are widely set in terms of SULT, and were there to be
nominalrigidity of wage and price contracts in terms of this numéraire, the interest rate
in terms of SULT would be the relevant monetary policyinstrument if monetary policy
aimed to inuence the output gap or, in models with disaggregated output or labour
markets, the degree of relative price or wage dispersion cased by nominal wage or price
rigidities.
The examples cited above show that it is not clear a-priori, whether the private
31A mindset, in decision science and general systems theory, refers to a set of assumptions, methods
and notations that create a powerful incentive to continue to agree with prior conclusions, to use prior
tools. It is described as a mental inertia, or groupthink, or paradigm applying to analysis and
decision and solutions, and which is hard to escapeFrom Wikipedia[43].
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numéraire will follow the currencyor follow the monetary authoritiesnumérairewhen
the unit of account of the monetary authorities is unbundled from the currency. It is not
an issue that can be settled a-priori by reasoning from rst principles, but an empirical
matter.
If the unit of account were to follow the currencyin the Eisler economy, the sterling
Phillips curve (4) and the Taylor rule for the sterling nominal interest rate (6a) and
(6b) would become irrelevant. In their place would come a drachma Phillips curve,
incorporating rigidity of nominal drachma prices, as in (33), and a Taylor rule for the
drachma nominal interest rate on bonds, incorporating a drachma ination target, as in
(34a). That the nominal interest rate on drachma bonds is subject to the lower bound set
by the interest rate on drachma currency, now becomes a constraint on monetary policy,
as is apparent from (34b). The indexation rules of the constrained price setters (given
by (11), (12), (13) or (14) in the sterling economy) now become indexation rules (not
reproduced below) relating individual drachma prices to the past, present or anticipated
future aggregate drachma ination.
t;t 1   !t;t 1 = (yt   y) + Et
 
t+1;t   !t+1;t

(33)
it+1;t = + Et~

t+1;t + (Et~

t+1;t   b~); if + Et~t+1;t + (Et~t+1;t   b~)  iMt+1;t (34a)
= iMt+1;t if + Et~

t+1;t + (Et~

t+1;t   b~) < iMt+1;t (34b)
If the numéraire follows the currency, the resulting economy is not the Eisler economy
(with the drachma as currency and sterling as numéraire) but a pure drachma economy,
equivalent in every respect to the original sterling economy, except for the, economically
irrelevant (for both nominal and real equilibrium values), change in the name of the
currency and numéraire from sterling to drachma.
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3.3 Should the authorities target the price level in terms of the
numéraire?
Assume for the sake of argument that, despite the abolition of sterling currency and the
introduction of drachma currency, sterling remains the numéraire and that the sterling
nominal price rigidities, reected in the sterling Phillips curve (4), are una¤ected by the
change in currency. In this Eisler economy, should the authorities target the sterling price
level/ination rate or the drachma price level/ination rate? Should they target price
stability (a zero rate of ination going forward) in terms of the numéraire (sterling) or in
terms of the currency (drachma)?
In the Eisler economy, the social optimum is achieved when the pecuniary opportunity
cost of holding drachma balances equals zero and actual output equals capacity output.
This is achieved by equating the nominal interest rates on drachma currency and bonds,
as in (35). With fully exible sterling prices, the optimal output level is achieved auto-
matically. With Calvo price contracts, actual and capacity output levels are equated by
achieving equality between the actual and core ination rates of sterling producer prices,
as in (16) and (17).
iMt+1;t = i

t+1;t (35)
Assuming that the nominal interest rate on (drachma) currency is zero, the optimal
risk-free nominal interest rate on drachma bonds is also equal to zero: it+1;t = 0: That
implies a unique rate of drachma consumer price ination. Consider the simplest sta-
tionary example where capacity output and real government spending are constant. It
follows that private consumption is constant, Ct = ey G, and therefore that the risk-free
real interest rate is equal to the pure rate of time preference:
~rt+1;t = : (36)
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The expected rate of ination of drachma consumer prices equals minus the pure rate
of time preference:
Et~

t;t+1 =  : (37)
When sterling prices are fully exible, any sequence of sterling producer and consumer
price ination rates is equivalent from the point of view of consumer welfare. With Calvo
price contracts, the optimal rate of sterling producer price ination equals the core rate
of producer price ination, whatever that happens to be:
t;t 1 = !t;t 1: (38)
With both the sterling nominal interest rate, it+1;t; and the indirect tax rate,  t;
available, the authorities can validate any core ination process (the sterling interest
rate can be set freely despite the optimal drachma nominal interest rate being zero,
because the authorities control the exchange rate between sterling and drachma). Unless,
fortuitously, the sterling producer price core ination process happens to yield a zero rate
of ination each period, the optimal rate of sterling producer price ination will not be
zero. The optimal rate of sterling producer price ination need not even be constant.
When there is full current indexation with complete contemporaneous information, as in
(13), any sequence of ination rates for sterling producer prices, including zero, supports
the social optimum. The optimal rate of drachma price ination is, of course, negative,
since the time preference rate is positive. With a positive real interest rate a negative
drachma consumer price ination rate is required to achieve a zero nominal interest rate
and implement the Bailey-Friedman OQM rule.
In the special case of the cashless economy ( = 0); the OQM argument for a zero
nominal interest rate in terms of the currency (drachma) and the associated negative
optimal rate of drachma consumer price ination ceases to apply. Optimal monetary
policy then just involves achieving equality between actual output and capacity output.
31
This is achieved automatically when sterling prices are fully exible. With Calvo price
contracts, the social optimum is again characterised by equality between actual and core
sterling producer price ination.
Not surprisingly, general equilibriummodels in which money only exists as a numéraire,
yield determinate relative prices and other real equilibrium variables, but an indetermi-
nate price level in terms of the numéraire when all prices are freely exible. This follows
immediately from the nominal indeterminacy of the exible price level equilibrium when
there is currency ( > 0) but the policy rules for the two nominal interest rates (in terms
of the currency) make both of them functions of real variables only. When there is no
nominal stock of money, there is no nominal anchor if nominal prices are exible.
Two approaches at overcoming this nominal indeterminacy have been proposed.
The rst, the so-called scal theory of the price level (see e.g. [19] and Woodford [44]),
proposed the stock of non-monetary nominal debt as a nominal anchor. It was shown
to be a fallacy in Buiter [4], [7] and Niepelt [39]. The second approach, of which the
New-Keynesian Phillips curve used in this paper is an example, abandons the assumption
of perfect nominal price and wage exibility and assumes that there is rigidity, inertia
or stickiness in prices and/or wages in terms of the numéraire. This eliminates the
nominal indeterminacy problem. The general price level is determined by history (ini-
tial conditions). Equilibrium nominal prices are determinate but unavoidably hysteretic
or path-dependent. The ination rate is determinate and not automatically hysteretic.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium ination rate is less likely in the cashless economy ( = 0)
than in an otherwise identical economy which has a transactions role for government-
issued at currency ( > 0): The reason is that in a model with currency, the boundary
condition involving the long-run behaviour of the present discounted value of the termi-
nal money stock (see equation (9)) restricts the set of possible equilibria (see Brock [3],
Buiter and Sibert [12] and Buiter [7]).
The result that optimal monetary policy will implement the Optimal Quantity of
Money rule for the drachma ination rate and will validate sterling producer price core
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ination, whatever that happens to be, is not robust to two important extensions of the
models considered here. The rst is the introduction of constraints on the ability of
the authorities to impose lump-sum taxes or make lump-sum transfers. With such con-
straints, seigniorage revenues, that is, the real resources appropriated by the authorities
through the issuance of base money, can become a valuable source of revenue for the au-
thorities. Depending on the details of the tax instruments assumed to be available, this
may raise the ination rate associated with the optimal monetary policy for any nominal
interest rate on money.
The second is menu costs, that is, the explicit consideration of the real resource
costs associated with changing prices or renegotiating price contracts, as in the papers
of Caplin and Spulber [14] and Caplin and Leahy [15]. Such menu costs should be
interpreted broadly to include the costs in terms of time, e¤ort and inconvenience of
working, computing and calculating with an inconvenient yardstick whose length can
vary from period to period. The implications of menu costs for the optimal rate of
ination depend crucially on the details of how menu costs are modeled. It makes a
di¤erence whether a real sunk cost is incurred every time a nominal price is changed, or
only when a new contract (which may involve indexation) is negotiated. Nominal price
changes that are the result of the mechanical implementation of an invariant indexation
rule may have lower menu costs than nominal price changes which are the result of
bargaining between buyers and sellers or the outcome of an auction. If menu costs
are assumed to be particularly important for the goods and services that make up the
cost-of-living index, this would drive the optimal ination rate of the cost of living index
closer to zero. If, as seems more plausible, menu costs are especially important for money
wages (negotiating and bargaining over wages, whether bilaterally or through organised
labour unions and/or employersassociations is costly and time-consuming), a zero rate
of money wage ination would be a natural focus of monetary policy. With positive
labour productivity growth, zero wage ination would imply a negative rate of ination
for the cost of living, consumer and producer price indices.
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4 Conclusion: is numérairology the (only) future of
monetary economics?
There are two fundamental but interesting weaknesses in Daviess analysis, each one of
which points to a pervasive key weakness in contemporary monetary theory . The rst is
the questionable assumption that the government (the monetary authority) determines
the numéraire or unit of account in terms of which key private wage and price contracts
are denominated, even if the currency is not denominated in terms of that numéraire. The
truth is that we have no satisfactory theory of what determines the numéraire in private
contracts. The second is the assumption that, assuming the authorities indeed determine
the private numéraire, the monetary policy objective should be the stabilisation of the
general price level in terms of that numéraire.
The government is certainly able, in the Eisler economy, to set itself a price level
or ination target dened in terms of the sterling price index and to use the nominal
interest rate on sterling bonds, to pursue that target unconstrained by the zero lower
bound on the sterling nominal interest rate. The question is, does it make sense, from
a welfare point of view, to target the sterling price index in the Eisler economy? This
paper demonstrates that, for the class of New Keynesian models under consideration, the
answer to this second question is, in general, negative.
Based on these considerations, Eislers escape route from the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates could well turn out to be a dead end. It raises, however, an
important and much-neglected issue in monetary economics  the determination and
signicance of the numéraire. Cognitive psychologists may explain why certain units of
account are more likely to be used in private transactions and mental arithmetic than
others. It is not something the monetary authority decides. It is patently not true
that the unit of account in a purely at system can simply be dened in terms of one
of the liabilities of the central bank. It is a matter of individual choice buttressed by
social convention. The monetary authorities can unbundle the means of payment/unit of
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account function of the at currency it issues from the numéraire function as used by the
authorities themselves. They cannot unbundle by at the means of payment/medium of
exchange function and the unit of account function for the economy as a whole.
The Eisler economy separates the medium of exchange/means of payment function of
money, which requires the existence of money as a nancial instrument, from its role as
numéraire. It is but a small intellectual step from this to doing away with the medium
of exchange function/means of payment functions of money altogether. This brings us to
the cashless economy where short government bonds (or perfect substitutes for them such
as bank reserves with the central bank) are the numéraire. The importance of a serious,
that is, deep structural, positive and normative theory of the numéraire is underlined by
the recent growth of an inuential literature for which the numéraire or unit of account
(or, strictly speaking) medium of account function is the only primitive one left of the
traditional Hicksian triad: means of payment (medium of exchange), store of value and
unit of account. The medium of exchange has disappeared. While a pure virtual currency
that serves as numéraire does not have to be a store of value itself, there must exist some
nancial instrument denominated in terms of the virtual currency - a nancial instrument
that is a store of value - for which the authorities can set the interest rate in terms of
that virtual currency, if the authorities are to be able to control the rate of ination in
terms of the numéraire.32
Clarida, Galli and Gertler [18], Woodford [45], Golosov and Lucas [29] and many
others propose models without a medium of exchange or means of payment but with a
numéraire in terms of which key private contracts (wages and prices) are denominated
and with authorities capable of setting the interest rate in terms of that numéraire. A
justication o¤ered by Golosov and Lucas ([29], pp. 12-13) for the omission of a monetary
nancial instrument is that money can be added to the period utility function without this
changing any of the key behavioural properties of the model, provided real money balances
32Patinkins abstract unit of account - phlogiston, say -need not be a store of value, but the government
must be willing and able to issue phlogiston-denominated nancial instruments whose interest rate it
can set and that the private sector is willing to hold.
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enter the period utility function in an additively separable manner. This is clearly not
correct as regards the welfare economics of alternative monetary policies. Whenever the
demand for real money balances is sensitive to the nancial opportunity cost of holding
money balances, shoe-leather cost and cash goods/credit goods considerations inuence
the optimal monetary policy rule, in addition to the nominal price or wage rigidities (due
to menu costs or other considerations) that are considered by Golosov and Lucas, and
that can cause deviations of actual output or employment from their natural levels as
well as suboptimal cross-sectional and time-series distributions of relative prices.
As regards the positive economics of consumption, labour supply and production,
we know from a large literature on money-in-the-utility function, money-in-the-shopping
function, real cash management, money-in-the-production function and cash-in-advance
models, that alternative monetary policy rules in general support di¤erent real equilib-
ria (see e.g. the literature surveyed in Walsh [42], McCallum and Goodfriend [35] and
McCallum [37]). A simple example is the way the boundary condition constraining the
present discounted value of the terminal stock of money balances rules out deationary
bubble equilibria in an economy with currency that would be feasible in an otherwise
identical cashless economy (see Buiter and Sibert [12] and Buiter [7]). This example of
money mattersholds even if real money balances enter the period utility function in an
additively separable manner (see Buiter [5], [7] and Buiter and Sibert [12]). The zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates also disappears from view when money as a store
of value is absent from the model.
Money issuance (seigniorage) provides the government with a source of revenue that
can be (and has been) quantitatively signicant in many developing countries and emerg-
ing markets, even though in advanced industrial countries with well-developed nancial
and payments systems, its contribution to government revenue is minor. Of course, the
excess burden imposed by distortionary taxes cannot be assessed from the amount of
revenue it raises. Furthermore, even when the contribution of seigniorage to government
revenue is small in normal times, the capacity to use monetary nancing, including both
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the anticipated and the unanticipated ination taxes on money and on other nominally
denominated xed-rate nancial instruments, can have important welfare implications
during abnormal times if the government does not have su¢ cient lump-sum tax instru-
ments and only a restricted set of commodity or income taxes.
Finally, the contemporary fashion for studying the role of money is complete market
models deprives central bank (government) at liabilities of their unique creditworthiness
and liquidity properties, which are crucial in times of crises and disorderly markets.33
With complete markets there is no default in equilibrium. Disorderly markets therefore
will not occur and liquidity is not an interesting property of nancial claims, because
everything will be equally liquid. In a world with incomplete markets, default can
occur in equilibrium. Fear of default can cause illiquidity of otherwise sound nancial
and real assets. The fact that the central bank is an agent of the state and that the
state is the agent with the uniquely deep pockets (through its capacity to tax) means
that the creditworthiness and liquidity of central bank liabilities is second to none, indeed
unique. The monetary base may well disappear at some time in the not too distant future.
One can visualise a world where central bank currency is replaced by various forms of
private e-money and where commercial banks do not hold balances with the central bank.
However, such a world would no doubt have overdraft facilities, contingent credit lines
or other contingent arrangements for banks and other private nancial institutions with
the central bank, ensuring that central bank liquidity would be available when needed.
Monetary economics without money, that is, without the unique at liabilities of the
central bank or the unique capacity of the central bank (as agent of the state) to create
nancial instruments of unquestioned creditworthiness and liquidity, in any amount, at
little or no notice and at little or no cost, would seem to be, as yet, a bridge too far.
33See Goodhart [31] for an eloquent development of this view.
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